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INTRODUCTION
Max Alexander Soffar, who had been arrested for motorcycle theft in
Harris County, Texas, hinted to the arresting officer that he had been involved
in the killing of bowling alley employees in Houston, Texas.  At the police
station, officers summoned Officer Clawson to assist in the interrogation.
Soffar had previously worked as an informant for Clawson and viewed him as
a friend.  Clawson gave Soffar a new set of Miranda warnings and Soffar
waived his rights.  A little later, Detective Schultz questioned Soffar and
Soffar recounted details relating to the killings that Schultz believed “only the
perpetrator would know.”1
After about thirty minutes of questioning, Schultz exited the interrogation
room and told Clawson he had “hit a brick wall” with Soffar.  Clawson then
again spoke with Soffar.  During this conversation, they had the following
interchange according to Clawson:
Soffar: Should I get an attorney or talk to the detective?
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2. Id. at 605 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 591 (majority opinion).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.  In the state habeas hearing, which took place earlier, Clawson testified that he had told
Soffar, “yes, you are.”  See id. at 591 n.3.
7. Id. at 591.
8. Soffar v. Johnson, 237 F.3d 411, 457 (5th Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 253 F.3d
227 (5th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc sub nom. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2002).
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
11. Soffar v. Johnson, 237 F.3d at 453 (quoting Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th
Cir. 1979)).
Clawson: If [you were] involved in the crime, you should tell the detective [you
were] in it; otherwise [you] should get a lawyer.2
Soffar then asked Clawson “how he could get a lawyer.”3  In response,
Clawson asked Soffar “if he could afford a lawyer,” despite “knowing that he
could not.”4  Soffar next asked Clawson how he could get a court-appointed
lawyer and how soon he could have one.  Although Clawson knew that Harris
County had a 72-hour rule, which provides that a suspect must be charged
(and provided with an attorney) or released within 72 hours, he did not tell
that to Soffar.  Instead, Clawson replied “that he did not know Harris County
procedures,” but he “guessed that it could take as little as one day or as long
as a month.”5  Soffar then said, “so you’re telling me I’m on my own.”6
Clawson remained silent.
Soffar then agreed to answer questions.  Subsequently, he signed
statements in which he admitted participating in the Houston bowling alley
killings.  These statements were used by the government to obtain Soffar’s
conviction and death sentence.7
A panel of the Fifth Circuit held that Clawson’s responses to Soffar
violated Soffar’s right to have an attorney present during a custodial
interrogation,8 as guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona9 and Edwards v.
Arizona.10  Following Fifth Circuit precedent, the panel held that Clawson’s
responses to Soffar’s questions violated Miranda and Edwards because an
officer responding to an ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney is not
permitted to “mislead [a suspect] into abandoning his equivocal request for
counsel.”11
On rehearing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite
result.  The en banc court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in
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12. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
13. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d at 595-96 & n.6 (noting that Davis “established a bright-line rule”
where “a statement either is such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not”) (quoting Davis, 512 U.S.
at 459), while the panel opinion utilized a totality of circumstances analysis and held that Soffar had
“unambiguously requested counsel” (citing Soffar v. Johnson, 237 F.3d at 457).
14. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d at 596.
15. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
Davis v. United States12 preempted the Fifth Circuit’s pre-Davis prohibition
on interrogation tactics designed to mislead suspects who asked about or made
equivocal references to requesting an attorney.13  It further concluded that
Clawson’s misleading statements did not invalidate Soffar’s prior waiver of
his Miranda rights and, therefore, Soffar’s waiver of his right to request an
attorney during his custodial interrogation was valid.14
The interchanges between Soffar and Clawson provide two examples of
the tactics police interrogators employ when a suspect in police custody refers
to the possibility of requesting an attorney or asks an officer about having one.
The two Soffar opinions, moreover, provide some indication of the approaches
courts have adopted in addressing whether such tactics violate suspects’
rights.  In particular, the Fifth Circuit’s en banc Soffar opinion suggests that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis may have had unanticipated
consequences, providing the police with extraordinarily wide leeway to
employ interrogation tactics that deflect suspects from requesting an attorney
during a custodial interrogation.
In this article, I describe interrogation tactics that the police employ to
deflect suspects from requesting an attorney and consider approaches that the
courts are or should be using to safeguard the suspect’s right to have an
attorney present during custodial interrogation.  In Part I, I provide some
background relating to the suspect’s right to request an attorney during a
custodial interrogation, explaining how pre-Miranda interrogation manuals
addressed this issue, surveying the most recent empirical data relating to it and
tracing ways in which the Court addressed it in Miranda and in post-Miranda
cases.  In Part II, I provide an overview of the tactics employed by
interrogators when a suspect refers to or asks a question about having an
attorney.  In Part III, I discuss the tests employed by lower court cases after
Davis.  As I explain, most lower courts have interpreted the Court’s decisions
in Moran v. Burbine15 and Davis to provide tests that allow interrogators to
employ a wide range of tactics that are designed to deflect suspects from
invoking their right to an attorney.  In Part IV, I argue that stricter tests are
appropriate.  Drawing especially from the Court’s analysis in Missouri v.
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16. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
18. Id. at 455.
19. See, e.g., FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 51-64 (4th ed.
2001) (advising interrogators how they can physically arrange the interrogation room so as to enhance the
suspect’s feelings of isolation).  See generally Charles D. Weisselberg, The Detention and Treatment of
Aliens Three Years After September 11:  A New New World?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 815, 844-46 (2005)
(quoting from sources showing pre- and post-Miranda interrogators’ emphasis on isolating the suspect and
depriving her of outside support).
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.  See also Weisselberg, supra note 19, at 841-43 (quoting the Director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s description of techniques designed to undermine the resistance of
aliens detained for interrogation).
21. See, e.g., State v. Reilly, No. 5285 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 1974), vacated, 355 A.2d 324
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1976) (noting that the interrogator led the eighteen-year-old suspect to view him as a
“father”).  See generally Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581,
615 nn.175-78 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery] (quoting from interrogations of Reilly and other
cases in which interrogators successfully established bonds of trust with suspects).
Seibert,16 I argue that interrogators should be prohibited from employing
interrogation tactics that are likely to have the effect of undermining a
suspect’s understanding of the right to have an attorney present or the nature
of the protection provided by that right.  In addition, because a suspect’s
waiver of the Miranda rights must be intelligent,17 I argue that the police
should be required to answer accurately suspects’ questions relating to the
circumstances under which an attorney will be provided if the suspect requests
one.  In Part V, I illustrate how these tests should apply in practice by
considering ten examples.  In Part VI, I offer concluding observations.
I.  BACKGROUND
As the Court recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, interrogation training
manuals advise interrogators that an essential element of a successful
interrogation is “to deprive [the suspect] of any outside support.”18  The latest
interrogation materials continue to emphasize that the interrogator needs to be
alone with the suspect in order to develop a relationship that will encourage
the suspect to confess or at least to make potentially incriminatory statements
to the interrogator.19  The relationship may be one in which the interrogator
dominates the suspect (i.e., overpowering “his will to resist”),20 one in which
he establishes a bond with the suspect so that the suspect will trust him,21 or
simply one in which he convinces the suspect that it is in his best interest to
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22. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 19, at 419 (stating that in order “to persuade a suspect whom the
investigator believes to be lying about involvement in a crime to tell the truth,” the investigator must
convince “the suspect to believe that he will benefit in some way by telling the truth”).
23. See id. at 395 (observing that interrogations may last “several hours”); see also Weisselberg,
supra note 19, at 842 (quoting the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s statement that effective
interrogation of detained aliens “is a process that can take a significant amount of time” and that in some
cases “interrogators have been unable to obtain valuable intelligence from a subject until months, or even
years, after the interrogation process began”).
24. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 112 (1962).
25. Id.  Other pre-Miranda interrogation manuals were similar.  See W.R. KIDD, POLICE
INTERROGATION 169-72 (1953) (advising interrogators how to deal with a suspect who asks for the presence
of counsel; among other things, the interrogator is advised that he might say to the suspect, “Why should
this very confidential matter get into the hands of a third person?  Maybe this lawyer is your friend, but
maybe he will use the information against you at some later time.  You have nothing to fear if innocent.”);
HAROLD  MULBAR, INTERROGATION 13 (1951) (advising interrogators to keep phones out of the
interrogation room so that the suspect won’t think of calling an attorney; if the suspect asks to call an
attorney, the interrogator should “get into a long harangue about the needlessness of his contacting
anyone”).
26. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 318 & n.1 (1959) (noting that the defendant asked
to call his attorney but that the officers told him they could not find the attorney’s name in the phone
book—a statement about which the Court expressed skepticism because the attorney’s name in fact
appeared in the phone book).
27. See, e.g., State v. Biron, 123 N.W.2d 392, 394, 396 (Minn. 1963) (stating that the tape of the
defendant’s six-hour interrogation indicates that, when the defendant told the police he “would like to have
his sister call a lawyer,” police interrogators asked him what lawyer he wanted them to call and dropped
the subject when the defendant could not name a lawyer; later, the police told the defendant the police were
disclose information to him.22  Depending on the circumstances, establishing
such a relationship may take considerable time.23
If the suspect is allowed to have an attorney present during the
interrogation, this is likely to prevent the interrogator from having sufficient
time alone with the suspect to develop the necessary relationship.  Pre-
Miranda interrogation manuals thus advised interrogators how to deal with
suspects who requested or asked about the presence of an attorney.  The
leading interrogation manual (which was then authored by Fred Inbau and
John Reid) advised the interrogator to suggest to the suspect that, “particularly
if he [was] innocent of the offense under investigation,” he would be better off
dealing with the police by himself and thus saving himself or his family from
the expense of paying an attorney.24  The interrogator might add, “Joe, I’m
only looking for the truth, and if you’re telling the truth, that’s it.  You can
handle this by yourself.”25  During the pre-Miranda era, police were frequently
able to obtain incriminating statements from suspects who requested an
attorney or asked about the possibility of having one.  In some cases,
interrogators simply ignored the suspect’s request;26 in others, they were able
to dissuade the suspect from contacting an attorney.27
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the only friends he had and they were the ones who could help him).  A six-hour tape recording of the Biron
interrogation is on file in the libraries of the University of Michigan and the University of Minnesota
Schools of Law.  For more information relating to the Biron tape, see White, Police Trickery, supra note
21, at 615 n.177.
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
29. Id. at 444-45.
30. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
31. Id. at 484-85.
32. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 517.
34. Professor Otis Stephens pointed out that “an array of Supreme Court critics” accused the Warren
Court of “‘coddling criminals,’ ‘handcuffing police,’ and otherwise undermining ‘law and order’ at the very
time when police faced their most perilous and overwhelming challenge.”  OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 165 (1973).  For comments by other conservative critics of
Miranda, see WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS:  POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES
AFTER DICKERSON 57 (2001).
In Miranda, the Court held that the police may not interrogate a suspect
in custody unless they first warn him of certain rights, including the right to
have an attorney present during the interrogation and the right to have an
attorney appointed to represent him if he can’t afford one.28  Miranda also
stated that if the suspect requests an attorney, the police are not permitted to
interrogate him unless one is present.29  In Edwards v. Arizona,30 decided
fifteen years later, the Court reaffirmed this rule, holding that “when an
accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation,” the accused may not be “subject to further interrogation by the
authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication . . . with the police.”31
From the time Miranda was decided, Miranda’s critics have recognized
that, of the rights provided by Miranda, the suspect’s right to have an attorney
present during a custodial interrogation has the greatest potential for reducing
an interrogator’s ability to obtain confessions.  In his Miranda dissent, Justice
Harlan observed that warning the suspect of his right to remain silent and that
his statements could be used against him were “minor obstructions,”32 but “to
suggest or provide counsel for the suspect simply invites the end of the
interrogation.”33  Critics associated with law enforcement issued even more
dire predictions.34
Post-Miranda interrogators’ success in obtaining suspects’ incriminating
statements following their valid Miranda waivers demonstrates that these
predictions were erroneous.  Miranda’s requirements relating to warning
suspects and providing them with an attorney did not “end” or even
significantly impair police interrogation.  During the nineties, empirical data
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35. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s:  An Empirical Study
of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L.  REV. 839, 859 & n.115 (1996) (noting that 83.7 percent of suspects
from a sample of 129 waived their rights); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM . L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276 (1996) (noting that 78.3 percent of suspects from a sample of 175 waived their
rights).
36. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
37. Id. at 444 (“[C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-
incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to
the dictates of Miranda are rare.”  (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984))).  See
Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211,
1219-20 n.54 (2001) (noting that in cases during the years 1999 and 2000 “in which the police obtained
valid Miranda waivers, there were only four cases in 1999 and five in 2000 in which courts held the
suspect’s post-waiver confession involuntary”).
38. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs:  An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387,
497 (1996).
39. Id.
40. Paul G. Cassell, Reply:  All Benefits, No Costs:  The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1084, 1123 (1996).
41. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 35.  In this study, which was conducted over a six-week
period during the summer of 1994, researchers attended screening sessions held by the District Attorney’s
office in Salt Lake County, Utah to assess the prosecutorial merit of 219 suspects in felony cases.  Id. at
indicated that police interrogators were able to obtain valid Miranda waivers
from approximately 80% of all suspects.35  As the Court stated in Dickerson
v. United States,36 moreover, once a court has determined that a defendant has
validly waived his Miranda rights, incriminating statements made by the
suspect to the police will nearly always be admissible.37
Nevertheless, modern critics of Miranda have continued to focus on
Miranda’s requirements that the police warn the suspect of this right to have
an attorney and cease interrogation if he requests one.  In his pre-Dickerson
article asserting that Miranda’s warning and waiver requirements should be
replaced by an alternative that includes videotaping police interrogations,38
then-Professor (now Judge) Paul Cassell recommended dispensing “with the
Miranda offer of counsel” which he stated has been “identified as a
particularly harmful aspect of Miranda.”39  In a subsequent article, Cassell
emphasized that, under his proposal, law enforcement would be able to obtain
more incriminating statements from suspects because the “police would not
have to fold up the tent just because a suspect said the magic words ‘I want a
lawyer.’”40
The limited available data tends to confirm that the right to request an
attorney provides the most powerful safeguard for suspects confronted with
the possibility of custodial interrogation.  In an empirical study analyzing
cases in which Salt Lake City interrogators warned suspects of their Miranda
rights and the suspects responded,41 Cassell and Bret Hayman found that when
36 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:29
851-52.  The screening sessions consisted of forty-five minute interviews by the prosecutor of the police
officer who conducted the interrogation, and the interviews addressed the evidence supporting the filing
of charges.  Id. at 851.  Researchers were allowed to attend all screening sessions except in a few cases that
were particularly sensitive.  Id. at 851 & n.80.  During the screening sessions, the researchers filled out
survey forms detailing the cases’ relevant characteristics.  Id. at 851.
42. See id. at 861.  But see Leo, supra note 35, at 268, 276 (noting that in 7 of the 122 interrogations
observed during nine months of first-hand observation of police interrogation, detectives continued to
question suspects even after they invoked their Miranda rights).
43. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 35, at 859-60 & tbl.3.
44. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
45. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
46. See supra text accompanying note 31.
47. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103.
48. See generally George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1959 (2004).
49. Id. at 1970, 1972-73 tbl.2.
suspects invoked either the right to an attorney or the right to remain silent,
the interrogation ceased.42  In addition, they found that of the fifteen suspects
who invoked their rights, nine invoked the right to an attorney and six the right
to remain silent,43 suggesting that suspects may be more likely to invoke the
former right than the latter.
Through its decisions in Edwards44 and Michigan v. Mosley,45 the Court
has provided stronger protection for suspects who invoke the right to an
attorney than for those who invoke the right to remain silent.  If the suspect
invokes the right to an attorney, the police are not allowed to initiate further
attempts to obtain incriminating statements;46 if he invokes the right to remain
silent, on the other hand, the police may persist in seeking to interrogate him
so long as they “scrupulously honor” his invocation of his right.47  Thus, even
if suspects invoke their right to an attorney and their right to remain silent
with about equal frequency, suspects’ invocations of their right to an attorney
will likely have the effect of terminating more interrogations.
Professor George Thomas’s 2004 study of courts’ rulings on Miranda
issues48 provides support for this conclusion.  Based on a survey in June of
2002 of 211 cases in which Miranda issues were decided by courts, Thomas
found twenty cases in which suspects claimed to have invoked their right to
an attorney and six in which they claimed to have invoked their right to remain
silent.49  In eleven of the twenty cases in which the suspect claimed to have
invoked the right to an attorney, the government was unable to introduce any
incriminating statements because either the suspects’ statements were
suppressed or there was no questioning; in the six cases in which the suspects
claimed to have invoked the right to remain silent, on the other hand, the
defendants’ claims were rejected and their incriminating statements
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50. Id. at 1973 tbl.3.
51. Id. at 1979.
52. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
53. Lower courts took three positions on this issue.  Some courts held that any reference to an
attorney, no matter how ambiguous, required the termination of police questioning.  See, e.g., Maglio v.
Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 206-07 (6th Cir. 1978).  Others held that a suspect had to meet a certain level of clarity
for his invocation of counsel to end all questioning.  See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill.
1980).  The majority of lower courts, however, held that, upon an ambiguous reference to counsel, the
police were required to limit their questions to clarifying the suspect’s reference to counsel before
continuing with the interrogation.  See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text; see also Janet E.
Ainsworth, In a Different Register:  The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE
L.J. 259, 301-02 & nn.212-16 (1993) (citing cases); Scott R. Goings, Comment, Ambiguous or Equivocal
Requests for Counsel in Custodial Interrogations After Davis v. United States, 81 IOWA L. REV. 161,
166-67 (1995) (citing cases).
54. See, e.g., United States v. De La Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1992).  See generally Ainsworth, supra note 53, at
308-11 (citing additional cases); Goings, supra note 53, at 162 n.7 (citing additional cases).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fouche,
833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 1985) (Campbell,
C.J., dubitante) (citing Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979)); Nash v. Estelle,
597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976).
56. See, e.g., United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461-62 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen confronted
with an equivocal request for counsel, the interrogating officers must cease all substantive questioning and
limit further inquiries to clarifying the subject’s ambiguous statements.  These clarifying questions must
be purely ministerial, not adversarial, and cannot be designed to influence the subject not to invoke his
rights.” (citations omitted)).  The court said in Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979):
[T]he limited inquiry permissible after an equivocal request for legal counsel may not take the form
of an argument between interrogators and suspect about whether having counsel would be in the
suspect’s best interests or not.  Nor may it incorporate a presumption by the interrogator to tell the
suspect what counsel’s advice to him would be if he were present.  Such measures are foreign to the
purpose of clarification, which is not to persuade but to discern.
admitted.50  As Thomas states, these “data suggest what our intuition tells us:
the way for a suspect to avoid incriminating himself after he is given Miranda
warnings is to request counsel.”51
After the Court’s decision in Davis v. United States,52 the words used by
the suspect when she seeks to request counsel are critical.  Prior to Davis,
lower courts had split as to how interrogators were required to respond when
a suspect made an ambiguous reference to an attorney.53  The majority of
lower courts held that, if the suspect referred to an attorney in a way that
might indicate she desired to have an attorney present, the police were
required to ask clarifying questions designed to ascertain whether the suspect
was requesting an attorney.54  Some of these courts stated, moreover, that the
officer’s clarifying questions should be strictly limited to determining the
suspect’s desire for counsel.55  The officer would not be permitted to ask
questions designed to dissuade the suspect from requesting an attorney.56  In
38 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:29
57. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994); see also supra note 53.
58. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62.  The Court stated that, in order to make an unambiguous request,
a suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”  Id.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 595-97 (5th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Singletary, 30
F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994).  For further discussion of the approach adopted by these cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 82-84, 98-100.
61. See Ainsworth, supra note 53, at 312.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
Davis, the Court adopted a narrower test that had previously been applied by
only a minority of jurisdictions:57  If the suspect unambiguously requests an
attorney, the police must cease the interrogation;58 if the suspect makes only
an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney, however, the police may
simply continue the interrogation.  They have no obligation to clarify whether
the suspect in fact desires an attorney.59
Davis did not address the question of how police interrogators are
permitted to respond when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an
attorney or asks a question about having one.  Since Davis eliminated the need
for clarifying questions, however, some lower courts have concluded that the
restrictions imposed on interrogators responding to a suspect’s reference to an
attorney or questions as to whether he should have an attorney no longer
apply.60  As a result, in some jurisdictions, interrogators’ freedom to employ
tactics designed to deflect suspects from invoking their right to an attorney is
broader now than it was prior to Davis.
II.  INTERROGATION TACTICS THAT DEFLECT A SUSPECT FROM REQUESTING
AN ATTORNEY
Even before Davis, it was clear that interrogators employed tactics that
had the effect of dissuading suspects from invoking their right to an attorney.
In a 1993 article, Professor Janet Ainsworth identified several such tactics.61
Since Davis, it appears that interrogators have refined these tactics.  Because
of the law governing post-Davis interrogation tactics, moreover, these tactics
are now more likely to be successful in the sense that they not only deflect
suspects from requesting attorneys but also result in the admission of the
suspects’ incriminating statements.
In contrast to the pre-Miranda Inbau interrogation manual,62 post-
Miranda interrogation manuals do not advise interrogators to employ tactics
that are designed to dissuade suspects who express an interest in having an
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63. Post-Miranda interrogation manuals typically state that, if the suspect requests an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.  See, e.g., ARTHUR S. AUBRY, JR. & RUDOLPH R.
CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 158-59 (3d ed. 1980); CHARLES L. YESCHKE, INTERVIEWING:  A
FORENSIC GUIDE TO INTERROGATION 9 (2d ed. 1993); DAVID E. ZULAWSK I & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER,
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 38 (1992).
64. Ainsworth identifies five tactics, including “suggesting to a suspect that she does not yet need
a lawyer” and “advising her that having counsel would not be in her best interests.” Ainsworth, supra note
53, at 312.  The number of tactics that could be identified depends, of course, on the degree of specificity
used to describe each tactic.
65. In seven of the nine cases from which the examples are drawn, the court either states or it
appears clear that the portions of the colloquy between the police and the suspect deemed relevant by the
court were electronically recorded.  In the other two cases, Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2003)
and Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2002), the court’s version of the colloquy between the
suspect and the police deemed relevant by the court is based on the officers’ testimony, and there is no
indication that the defense disputed any material aspect of this testimony.
attorney from requesting one.63  To date, moreover, there is no clear evidence
that interrogation training advises police interrogators as to how to respond
when suspects make statements or ask questions relating to the possibility of
requesting an attorney.
Nevertheless, examples from reported cases indicate that post-Davis
interrogators often employ sophisticated strategies to deflect suspects from
requesting attorneys.  Although the interrogation tactics employed can be
classified in various ways,64 it is perhaps most useful to focus on the action by
the suspect that precipitates the interrogation tactic.  I will thus consider:
(1) tactics employed when the suspect makes an ambiguous request for an
attorney or otherwise refers to the possibility of having one present at the
interrogation; (2) tactics employed when the suspect asks the interrogator
whether she should have an attorney; and (3) tactics employed when the
suspect asks a question concerning the circumstances under which an attorney
will be provided.  In this Part, I briefly explain the tactics interrogators employ
in these situations.  In Part V, I discuss ten examples drawn from nine post-
Davis cases in which courts provide apparently full and accurate accounts of
the interchanges between interrogators and suspects.65  As these examples
suggest, in terms of both deflecting suspects from requesting an attorney and
in obtaining admissible incriminating statements, post-Davis interrogators
have been remarkably successful.  In all of these cases, the police successfully
dissuaded the suspect from requesting an attorney, and the courts held that the
suspects’ subsequent statements to the police were admissible.
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66. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695, 697 (Va. 2002).  For a discussion of
the Redmond case, see infra text accompanying notes 178-80.
67. Harper v. State, No. 03-00-00677-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7497, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App.
Nov. 8, 2001).  For a discussion of the Harper case, see infra text accompanying notes 174-78.
68. See People v. Adams, 627 N.W.2d 623, 628-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).  During the interrogation
in Adams, the suspect asked if he could have some time to decide whether he wanted to talk to an attorney.
The officer told him he “certainly [could]” but added that “once you say you want a lawyer, our interview
is done.  And quite possibly the chances for an explanation as to what went wrong that day goes out the
tubes.  Possibly.  Very probably.  Okay?  As I told you before, this is your one shot.”  Id.
69. Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 573-74 (4th Cir. 1999).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 1-7.
A.  Tactics Employed When the Suspect Refers to the Possibility of
Requesting an Attorney
When the suspect refers to the possibility of requesting an attorney, the
most frequently employed interrogation strategy is to make it clear to the
suspect that invoking her right to have an attorney present will make it more
difficult for her to tell her story to the police.  In some cases, simply making
this clear to the suspect will be enough to deflect the suspect from requesting
an attorney.  Some suspects mistakenly believe that the immediate benefits of
telling their stories to the police outweigh the potential harmful consequences
of not requesting an attorney.  In other cases, the officer may also implicitly
or explicitly advise the suspect that telling his story to the police (which he
can only do only without an attorney) will be to his advantage.  In some cases,
the police will suggest or imply to the suspect that telling his story will be to
his legal advantage because it will enable him to “help himself,”66 in others,
they may simply explain to him that telling his story will make him feel better
because it will enable him to “get this off [his] chest.”67
B.  Responding to a Suspect’s Question Relating to Whether He Should
Have an Attorney
When the suspect asks a police officer whether he should request an
attorney, officers have employed a variety of strategies.  He can decline to
answer the suspect’s question but then tell or suggest to the suspect that, if he
requests an attorney, he will probably not be able to tell his story to the police
and obtain the advantages that could accrue from telling his story.68
Alternatively, he can answer the suspect’s question and tell him either that he
shouldn’t request an attorney at all69 or, as in the Soffar case,70 that he
shouldn’t request one if a certain condition is met.  Or the officer can provide
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71. See Clark v. Murphy, 317 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2003).  For a discussion of the Murphy
case, see infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 169-72.
73. See supra text accompanying note 5.
74. See United States v. Bezanson-Perkins, 390 F.3d 34, 36-38 (1st Cir. 2004).  For a discussion
of the Bezanson-Perkins case, see infra text accompanying notes 201-04.
75. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
an apparently non-responsive answer that is likely to dissuade the suspect
from requesting an attorney.71
C.  Responding to a Suspect’s Question Concerning the Circumstances
Under Which an Attorney Will Be Provided
When the suspect asks the officer a question relating to the circumstances
under which an attorney will be provided, even the officer’s accurate answer
may dissuade the suspect from requesting an attorney.  If the suspect learns
that he will not be able to see the attorney for a considerable time, he may
decide to proceed without one.72  In some cases, however, the officer will
answer the suspect’s question inaccurately, perhaps, as in Soffar,73
exaggerating the time that the suspect will have to wait before he can see an
attorney.  In some cases, moreover, the officer will explain the suspect’s
options in a way that may confuse the suspect as to the protection he will be
afforded by requesting an attorney.74
III.  TESTS APPLIED BY LOWER COURTS IN THE POST-DAVIS  ERA
In contrast to pre-Davis cases, which sometimes imposed significant
restrictions on police interrogation tactics that dissuaded a suspect from
requesting an attorney,75 post-Davis cases have provided remarkably little
restraint on such tactics.  In fact, most courts seem to have interpreted Davis’s
holding to mean that tactics designed to deflect suspects from requesting
counsel will be subject to little or no scrutiny.  In some cases involving such
police tactics, courts do not even discuss the possibility that the tactics vitiated
the suspect’s waiver of the right to an attorney, but simply conclude that the
suspect did not invoke his right to an attorney because he did not make a
sufficiently unambiguous request to satisfy the Davis test.76
Courts that have addressed the validity of post-Davis interrogation tactics
have adopted several approaches that make it especially difficult for a
defendant to establish that an interrogation tactic vitiated his waiver of the
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77. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
82. 300 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2002).
83. See id. at 596.
84. See, e.g., Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1996); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d
1420, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1994).  But cf. Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 10-11 (Del. 1998), aff’d, 795 A.2d
651 (Del. 2002) (stating in dicta that, under the state constitution, police are required to respond to a
suspect’s equivocal reference to an attorney with clarifying questions that are not designed to dissuade the
suspect from requesting an attorney).
right to an attorney.  First, in dealing with police responses to suspects’
references to or questions about attorneys, some courts have held that Davis’s
elimination of the requirement that the police ask clarifying questions when
a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an attorney has also eliminated any
requirement that the police refrain from dissuading the suspect from
requesting an attorney.77  Second, in dealing with cases in which the police
interrogation tactics that dissuade a suspect from requesting an attorney occur
after the suspect’s initial waiver of his Miranda rights, some courts have held
that in order to invalidate the suspect’s prior waiver, the defendant will have
to negate the evidence showing that he understood his Miranda rights at the
time he waived them.78  And, third, in determining whether the police use of
interrogation tactics results in an involuntary waiver of the suspect’s right to
an attorney, some courts have applied a very permissive test that places
emphasis on the suspect’s knowledge and background as well as the coercive
effect of the police interrogation tactics.79  As the Soffar case illustrates,80
moreover, some courts apply more than one of these tests in the same case.
A.  The Elimination of Restrictions on Misleading Clarification Questions
As I have indicated,81 in Soffar v. Cockrell,82 the Fifth Circuit en banc
held that, since Davis eliminated any requirement that the police ask clarifying
questions relating to whether the suspect was requesting an attorney,
restrictions on tactics designed to dissuade the suspect from making such a
request were also eliminated.83  Other courts have also relied on Davis to
abandon or modify pre-Davis restrictions on clarifying questions that were
designed to dissuade suspects from requesting an attorney.84
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85. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d at 596.
86. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
87. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d at 596 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)).
88. Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d at 596.
89. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105-06 (1975); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 587
S.E.2d 532, 540-41 (Va. 2003); Medley v. Commonwealth, 602 S.E.2d 411, 417 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
90. See supra text accompanying note 87.
91. In Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999), a suspect, who had waived his Miranda
rights, asked the police officer during the subsequent interrogation, “Do you think I need an attorney here?”
Id. at 573.  The officer responded by “shaking his head slightly from side to side, moving his arms and
hands in a ‘shrug-like manner,’ and stating, ‘You’re just talking to us.’”  Id. at 573-74.  The court rejected
the suspect’s argument that this exchange invalidated his prior waiver, stating that “[i]t is clear from the
record that [the suspect], with his extensive experience in such matters, understood both his rights and the
consequences of their abandonment.  [The officer’s] expression of his opinion on the advisability of [the
B.  Requiring Defendants to Bear a Heavy Burden to Invalidate Prior
Waivers
In Soffar, the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion also stated that, because
Soffar had waived his Miranda rights several times before he asked Clawson
questions relating to his right to an attorney, the issue to be considered was
“whether Clawson’s misleading statements invalidated the multiple waivers
Soffar had given prior to the interview.”85
Because Soffar had already waived his rights, the court held that
Miranda’s prohibition on inducing waivers through “trickery”86 did not apply.
Instead, the court stated that “trickery or deceit is only prohibited to the extent
it deprives the suspect ‘of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the
nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’”87  In this case,
the court concluded that Clawson’s trickery could not have deprived Soffar of
the knowledge of his rights because Soffar had been given the Miranda
warnings and waived his rights numerous times prior to his interview with
Clawson.88
Other courts have also held that a suspect who has waived his Miranda
rights has to meet a higher burden in order to show that the police violated his
right to an attorney.89  Based on these courts’ analyses, the nature of the
evidence required to invalidate a prior waiver is unclear.  Soffar’s analysis
suggests that police trickery will invalidate the suspect’s prior waiver only if
the suspect can show that he did not understand the nature of his rights.90
Since the suspect’s prior waiver establishes that the suspect understood the
nature of his rights at the time of his waiver, it will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, for a suspect to show that an interrogator’s misleading
statements or other tactics vitiated his prior understanding of his rights.91
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suspect’s] consulting with counsel could not change that understanding.”  Id. at 575.
92. 390 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2004).
93. Id. at 41.
94. See State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 527 U.S.
1187 (2003), rev’d, 540 U.S. 124 (2003); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1991).
96. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see also infra text accompanying notes 104-05.
97. See Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2002).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 110-11 (1st Cir. 2000); Coleman v.
Consistent with this view, the First Circuit in United States v. Bezanson-
Perkins92 expressed doubt as to whether “police misstatements” of any kind
could invalidate a suspect’s prior Miranda waiver,93 and at least one state
court intimated that, once the suspect has waived his Miranda rights, the only
way he can establish a violation of his right to an attorney is by showing that
he made a request that meets the requirements of Davis.94
C.  Determining Whether the Defendant’s Waiver of the Right to an
Attorney Was Involuntary
In considering whether a defendant has validly waived his right to an
attorney, both pre- and post-Davis cases focus on whether a suspect’s waiver
of this right was voluntary.95  Although Miranda stated that police “trickery”
would render a defendant’s waiver involuntary,96 post-Miranda cases have
generally applied a totality of circumstances test that assesses not only the
potential impact of police interrogation tactics but also the individual
characteristics of the suspects on whom such tactics are employed.97  In
assessing these factors, post-Davis cases have generally found that, even in
cases in which police employ clearly deceptive interrogation tactics, the
suspect’s waiver of his right to counsel is voluntary.
The Soffar case again provides a good illustration.  In concluding that
Soffar’s waiver of his right to an attorney was voluntary, the Fifth Circuit said
very little about Clawson’s misleading statements or their probable impact on
Soffar.  Instead, the court emphasized that Soffar “instigated the discussion”
about the crime the police were investigating,98 that he subsequently waived
his rights, and that he “continuously volunteered information about the crime
during his interrogation.”99  In finding other suspects’ waivers to be voluntary,
courts have taken into account the suspects’ backgrounds, including their prior
experiences with criminal procedure.100
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Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1426 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Owens, 142 F. Supp. 2d 255, 260, 266
(D. Conn. 2001).
101. See Hart v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 888-89, 895 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 17-year-
old defendant’s Miranda waiver involuntary where, after defendant signed the waiver form, detective made
“statements contradicting the Miranda warnings,” including the statement that “honesty wouldn’t hurt him”
and that, in her opinion, the disadvantage of requesting an attorney was “I’m going to want to ask you
questions and he’s going to tell you you can’t answer me.”).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 92 F.3d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1996); Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d
16, 27-28 (Nev. 2004); Harte v. State, 13 P.3d 420, 426 (Nev. 2000).
103. See supra notes 100, 102.  With the exception of United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d at
111-12, the courts in all the cases cited in those notes found the suspect’s waiver voluntary.
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490
n.14).
105. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
106. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
In rare instances, post-Davis cases applying a totality of circumstances
test have concluded that an officer’s deceptive interrogation tactics rendered
the suspect’s waiver of his right to an attorney involuntary.101  In the great
majority of such cases, however, courts have concluded that, based on an
assessment of the totality of circumstances, sometimes including the suspect’s
maturity or prior experience with the police,102 the suspect’s waiver was
voluntary.103
IV.  ASSURING THAT THE SUSPECT HAS AN ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF
THE RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY DURING A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
A.  Miranda’s Prohibition on Waivers Induced by Trickery
In Miranda, the Court made it clear that, when the interrogation of a
suspect proceeds without the presence of an attorney, the government must
“demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived . . . his
right to retained or appointed counsel” in order to admit the defendant’s
statements into evidence.104  The Court added, moreover, that “any evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver” will render
the defendant’s waiver involuntary.105
While the Court has never repudiated Miranda’s dicta stating that
“trickery” will render a defendant’s waiver involuntary, post-Miranda cases
have emphasized that a suspect can make a voluntary and intelligent waiver
of his Miranda rights even though the police have failed to provide him with
information that would allow him to make a more informed choice as to
whether he should exercise his rights.  In Moran v. Burbine,106 the defendant
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107. Id. at 417-18.
108. Id. at 419.
109. Id. at 422.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 422-23.
112. Id. at 423-24.
113. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
was in police custody following his arrest for murder.  At the request of the
defendant’s sister, an attorney called the police and informed them that she
would act as the defendant’s counsel in the event the police intended to
question him.  The police promised the attorney they would not question her
client that evening.  Later that same evening, however, the police questioned
the defendant after they had warned him of his Miranda rights and received
his signed waiver.107  When they informed him of his right to an attorney, they
did not tell him about the attorney’s phone call or say anything that would
indicate an attorney was seeking to represent him during police interrogation.
While the lower court held that the failure to inform the defendant of the
attorney’s phone call vitiated his “otherwise valid” waiver,108 the Supreme
Court reversed.  In an opinion by Justice O’Connor, the majority admitted that
information relating to the attorney’s call might be relevant to the defendant’s
“decision to confess.”109  It concluded, however, that the police are not
required to “supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate
his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.”110  Rather,
in assessing the validity of a suspect’s waiver, the focus must be on whether
he understood his rights and voluntarily relinquished them.111  While the
interrogators’ withholding of information might be objectionable “as a matter
of ethics,” it “is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it
deprives a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the
nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.”112
Moran’s holding indicated that the interrogators’ failure to disclose the
attorney’s telephone call did not constitute “trickery” that would vitiate a
Miranda waiver.  In a later case, the Court indicated that “affirmative
misrepresentation” is more likely than the withholding of information to
establish such trickery.  In Colorado v. Spring,113 ATF agents arrested the
defendant for firearms offenses.  When the agents gave the defendant his
Miranda warnings, they failed to inform him that they would also question
him about a shooting that had occurred in Colorado.  The Court declined to
hold that “mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter
of an interrogation is ‘trickery’ sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of
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114. Id. at 576.
115. Id. at 576 n.8.
116. Id. (citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)).
117. The Court specifically declined to decide whether a waiver of Miranda rights would be valid
when obtained by affirmative misrepresentations by law enforcement officials as to the scope of the
investigation.  Spring, 479 U.S. at 576 n.8.
118. 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
119. An officer of that police department testified that the interrogation strategy of withholding
Miranda warnings until after the suspect confessed was not only utilized widely by his own department,
but also was promoted by a national police training organization and utilized in other departments.  Id. at
609-10.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 605.
122. Id.
123. In particular, after some prodding from the officer, the defendant admitted in her first statement
that she knew the mentally ill teenager was meant to die in the fire.  Id.  During the second questioning, the
officer reminded her that she had said the teenager was “supposed to die in his sleep” during the fire.  After
Miranda rights.”114  In a footnote, however, the Court distinguished a failure
to provide the suspect with relevant information from “affirmative
misrepresentations” relating to the nature of Miranda rights.115  The Court
cited pre-Miranda due process confession cases as examples in which
affirmative misrepresentations by the police had “invalidate[d] a suspect’s
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege”116 but declined to delineate the
circumstances in which affirmative misrepresentations would invalidate the
suspect’s Miranda waiver.117
B.  Seibert’s Prohibition on Interrogation Tactics Designed to Undermine
the Suspect’s Understanding of the Miranda Rights
In Missouri v. Seibert,118 the Court held that deceptive interrogation
tactics employed in that case vitiated a suspect’s Miranda waiver.  In Seibert,
the police arrested the defendant for her involvement in an arson that resulted
in the death of a mentally ill teenager.  Consistent with an interrogation
strategy taught by a national police training organization,119 the arresting
officer conducted what is known as a “two-stage interrogation.”120  He did not
give the defendant Miranda warnings when he first interrogated her.  During
the initial interrogation, the suspect made incriminating statements including
an admission that the mentally retarded teenager was “to die in his sleep.”121
After a twenty minute break, the same officer gave the defendant Miranda
warnings and obtained her signed waiver of her rights.122  He then questioned
her further about the fire, using her pre-warning statement to obtain
admissions similar to those she had made in that statement.123
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some further prodding, the defendant reaffirmed that statement.  Id.
124. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
125. Id. at 309-14.
126. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 611 (2004) (plurality opinion) (citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
127. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613.
128. Id. at 616.  Specifically, these facts included “the completeness and detail of the questions and
answers” in the first interrogation, “the overlapping content of the two statements,” the close proximity
between the two, “the continuity of police personnel,” and the “degree to which” the interrogator treated
the second interrogation “as continuous with the first.”  Id. at 615.
129. Id. at 613.
The purpose of the “two-stage interrogation” technique is to increase the
likelihood that the suspect will give incriminating statements during the
second stage of the interrogation, after she has been given the Miranda
warnings for the first time.  The interrogators who designed this tactic
believed that the suspect’s second statement would be admissible under
Oregon v. Elstad,124 which held that, when a suspect makes a statement that
is inadmissible under Miranda, a later statement given after the suspect has
been given the Miranda warnings and waived her rights will be admissible so
long as neither the first nor the second statement was involuntary.125
In Seibert, however, the Court by a 5-4 decision held that the defendant’s
second statement was inadmissible, regardless of whether either her first or
second statement was involuntary.  In an opinion by Justice Souter, a four-
Justice plurality concluded that the admission of the defendant’s second
statement violated Miranda because, prior to giving that statement, the
defendant was not “‘adequately and effectively’ advised of the choice the
Constitution guarantees.”126  The plurality determined that in Seibert the
warnings did not effectively advise the defendant of her rights because “just
after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had a genuine right
to remain silent.”127  In reaching its conclusion, the plurality emphasized that
in Seibert there were “facts . . . which by any objective measure reveal a
police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings.”128  The plurality
intimated, however, that whenever the police employ the “two-step
interrogation technique” under circumstances in which the suspect has made
significant incriminating admissions in the first interrogation, the second
interrogation occurs soon after the first, and the second interrogation is
designed to obtain essentially the same material that was obtained in the first,
the Miranda warnings will not effectively advise the defendant of her choice
to remain silent or to have an attorney present.  At best, the defendant will
likely be “perplex[ed]” as to the nature of the choices to be made;129 and,
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130. Id.
131. Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 621.
133. Id. at 622.  According to Justice Kennedy, “[c]urative measures should be designed to ensure
that a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the import and effect of the Miranda
warning and of the Miranda waiver.”  Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. One example of such an interrogation tactic is questioning “outside Miranda.”  This tactic,
because of her admissions during the first interrogation, she might reasonably
believe that exercising her rights would be “of no avail.”130
Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote necessary to support the
Court’s decision, concluded that the defendant’s second statement would be
inadmissible because “the two-step interrogation technique was used in a
calculated way to undermine the Miranda warnings.”131  Explaining that the
plurality’s test “envisions an objective inquiry from the perspective of the
suspect,”132 Justice Kennedy stated that, under his test, statements made
during the second interrogation would be excluded only when the police
intentionally employed the two-step interrogation strategy and adequate
“curative measures [were not] taken.”133  While he criticized the plurality for
applying a multi-factor test to assess the suspect’s awareness of his rights,
Justice Kennedy did not explain what factors would be used to determine
whether police interrogators intentionally employed a two-step interrogation
strategy.  He did state that his test would be narrower than the plurality’s134
and that it would apply “only in the infrequent case . . . in which the two-step
interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the
Miranda warning.”135
Seibert’s analysis indicates that affirmative misrepresentation that is
designed to prevent the defendant from being “adequately and effectively
advised” of the protections provided by Miranda will vitiate the suspect’s
waiver of the Miranda rights.  Based on Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion, however, Seibert could be read narrowly so as to apply only when
there was clear evidence that the interrogating officers were employing an
interrogation strategy designed to undermine the Miranda rights.  The case’s
impact might then be limited to situations such as Seibert itself in which the
officers admitted employing such a strategy or ones in which extrinsic
evidence—such as evidence that the officers were employing an interrogation
tactic that interrogation manuals or interrogation training recommended that
the police use for the purpose of undermining one or more of the Miranda
rights136—provided clear evidence of the officers’ intent.
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which is taught in interrogation training, is employed after a suspect has invoked one of his Miranda rights.
Typically, the interrogator will then tell the suspect that he would like to talk to him “off the record”
because he wants to understand what happens.  Through this tactic, the interrogator hopes to obtain
statements that will be admissible for the purpose of impeaching the suspect’s credibility in the event he
testifies at trial.  See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 714-18 (1975).  For a full analysis of the strategy of
questioning “outside Miranda,” see Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNE LL L. REV. 109,
132-40 (1998).
137. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994).  Significantly, the four Justices who joined
Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in Seibert disagreed with this aspect of the majority opinion in Davis.
In his concurring opinion for those four Justices in Davis, Justice Souter indicated that suspects who made
an equivocal reference to an attorney should be entitled to more protection than that provided by the
majority ruling in Davis.  See id. at 467 (Souter, J., concurring).
C.  The Tension Between Seibert and Davis
Seibert provides a basis for prohibiting interrogation tactics that are
designed to undermine a suspect’s understanding of the right to request an
attorney during a custodial interrogation.  There is some tension, however,
between Seibert and Davis.  According to the Davis majority, the primary
safeguards provided to suspects facing custodial interrogation are “the
Miranda warnings themselves.”137  The Seibert plurality, on the other hand,
would prohibit interrogation tactics that undermine a suspect’s understanding
of one or more of the Miranda rights.  In order to resolve the tension between
the two opinions, it is necessary to determine when an interrogation tactic
should be viewed as undermining a suspect’s understanding of a Miranda
warning, even though the Miranda warnings are generally viewed as providing
suspects with sufficient information to safeguard them from coercive
interrogation.
Justice Kennedy would resolve the tension by prohibiting only
interrogation tactics that were intentionally designed to undermine the
suspect’s understanding of a Miranda right.  In this context, however,
focusing on the officer’s intent seems especially inappropriate.  When an
officer informs a suspect of her Miranda rights, the officer’s goal is to conduct
a successful interrogation.  The more clearly the suspect understands her
Miranda rights, the more likely she is to invoke them and thereby thwart the
officer’s goal of conducting a successful interrogation.  As a result, the officer
will inevitably have a strong motive to undermine the suspect’s understanding
of her Miranda rights.
Because a suspect’s right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation is the constitutional safeguard that is most likely to thwart a
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138. See supra text accompanying note 33.
139. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (emphasizing that “custody must
be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his
circumstances”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (holding that in determining whether a
suspect is in custody “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would
have understood his situation”); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (holding that a public
safety exception to Miranda applies when “police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (stating that interrogation includes
“words or actions . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect”).
140. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (plurality opinion) (evaluating whether
Miranda warnings will be effective by “any objective measure”); id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the plurality in its “rejection of an intent-based test”).
141. See, e.g., Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667 (“The objective test furthers ‘the clarity of [Miranda’s]
rule.’” (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430)); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (“[O]ne of the
principal advantages of the Miranda [doctrine] . . . is the ease and clarity [of that rule].”).
142. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
successful interrogation,138 moreover, the officer is likely to be especially
concerned that the suspect not have a full understanding of the possible
benefits of requesting an attorney.  When dealing with a suspect who
evidences a possible interest in requesting an attorney, a sophisticated
interrogator may thus want to employ any legally permissible tactics that will
undermine the suspect’s understanding of the right to request an attorney.
Distinguishing between an officer’s desire to achieve a result and his
conscious purpose to achieve it will inevitably be unproductive.  The focus
should be on what interrogating officers are permitted to do, not on what they
intend to do.
In determining whether an officer has complied with Miranda, moreover,
the Court has consistently adopted objective tests that focus on the likely
effect of the police conduct on the suspect rather than on the officer’s
subjective intentions.139  In Seibert itself, all of the Justices except Justice
Kennedy concluded that, in determining whether there has been a Miranda
violation, an officer’s subjective intent should not be relevant.140  This
approach is consistent with the Fifth Amendment privilege, which bars
compulsion whether or not it is intended.
In addition, an objective test provides relatively clear guidelines for the
police.  Over the past three decades, various Justices have emphasized the
value of maintaining Miranda’s clarity.141  Indeed, in his concurring opinion
in Seibert, Justice Kennedy declared that “Miranda’s clarity is one of its
strengths.”142  In contrast to a test that depends on determining an interrogating
officer’s intent to undermine the Miranda warnings, assessing an interrogation
tactic’s likely impact on an average suspect’s understanding of the right to
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have an attorney present during a custodial interrogation should lead to
relatively clear lines for the police.
D.  Formulating Appropriate Tests
If an objective approach is adopted, when will a police interrogation tactic
prevent a suspect from being “adequately and effectively advised” of the right
to have an attorney present during a custodial interrogation?  In Miranda, the
Court viewed the suspect’s right to have an attorney present during custodial
interrogation as “indispensable to the protection of the [suspect’s] Fifth
Amendment privilege”143 because the presence of an attorney might be
necessary to preserve the suspect’s “right to choose between silence and
speech.”144  If the suspect felt he was not able to deal with police interrogators
on his own, the presence of an attorney was necessary to advise the suspect
and thereby prevent the possibility of coercion.
In post-Miranda cases, the Court has made it clear that the suspect does
not have an absolute right to have an attorney present whenever she is
interacting with the police while in custody.  Rather, when a suspect in
custody requests an attorney, she has a right to have an attorney present during
police interrogation.145  This means that the police must either provide her
with an attorney or cease any attempt to interrogate her.146
Nevertheless, the essence of the safeguard provided by the right to have
an attorney present during a custodial interrogation is that a defendant can
choose to have an attorney advise her with respect to how she should deal with
the police during a custodial interrogation rather than being required to deal
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with police interrogators on her own.147  The suspect should understand that,
if she is subject to police interrogation, she has the right to the assistance of
an attorney who will advise her as to whether she should exercise her right to
remain silent.  In addition, the suspect should understand that, until the
attorney requested is present, the police will not be permitted to interrogate
her.
Based on Seibert, the police should not be permitted to employ
interrogation tactics that will be likely to undermine the suspect’s
understanding of either her right to request an attorney or the protections that
such a request will safeguard.  In order to employ such a tactic, moreover, an
interrogator need not communicate false or inaccurate information to the
suspect.  In Seibert, the interrogator did not affirmatively misrepresent the
nature of the suspect’s Miranda rights.  He did not tell her, for example, that
exercising her right to remain silent would not help her because she had
already incriminated herself.  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
tactics employed prior to giving the suspect her warnings prevented her from
being “‘adequately and effectively’ advised of the choice the Constitution
guarantees.”148  At best, she would be confused as to the nature of the
protection provided by the Miranda rights.  Based on Seibert, an interrogation
tactic that is likely to confuse or mislead the suspect as to the nature of the
protection that requesting an attorney will provide should be prohibited.
In Seibert, the interrogation tactics that undermined the defendant’s
awareness of her Miranda rights occurred prior to the suspect’s waiver of her
rights.  In dealing with tactics that undermine the suspect’s understanding of
the nature of the right to request an attorney during the interrogation, however,
it should not matter whether the interrogation tactics that undermine the
suspect’s understanding of the right occur prior to or after the suspect’s initial
waiver of her Miranda rights.  In both Miranda and post-Miranda cases,149 the
Court has made it clear that the suspect has the right to request the presence
of an attorney at any time during a custodial interrogation.  Since the suspect’s
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right to request an attorney applies throughout the interrogation, the
prohibition on interrogation tactics that undermine the suspect’s understanding
of that right should also apply throughout the interrogation.150
In some cases, of course, determining whether interrogation tactics
undermine the suspect’s understanding of her right to have an attorney present
or the nature of the safeguard provided by requesting an attorney will be
difficult.  Even if an interrogation tactic does not convey inaccurate
information relating to the suspect’s right to an attorney, it may mislead the
suspect as to the value of having an attorney.  In such cases, there is obviously
some tension between the Davis majority’s view that “the Miranda warnings
themselves” provide the “primary protection” for suspects subjected to
custodial interrogation151 and the Seibert plurality’s view that the suspect must
be “adequately and effectively apprised” of her Miranda rights.152  In
resolving this tension, the focus should be on whether the police interrogation
tactic would be likely to distort the suspect’s understanding of any of her
Miranda rights.
In deflecting suspects from requesting an attorney, interrogators
frequently emphasize that requesting an attorney will impair the suspect’s
ability to tell her story to the police.153  In determining whether this tactic
undermines the suspect’s understanding of her right to request an attorney, the
focus should be on whether its employment seems likely to distort the
suspect’s understanding of the second Miranda warning.  If a police
interrogator simply tells the suspect that, if she requests an attorney, she will
not be able to tell her story to the interrogator at that time, this should not be
improper.  Since the interrogator is not stating or intimating to the suspect that
telling her story to the police will result in a tangible legal benefit, the
meaning of the second Miranda warning has not been distorted.  On the other
hand, if the interrogator tells the suspect that, once she requests an attorney
she will not be able to provide the police with an explanation that might lead
to a reduced charge, this tactic should be deemed improper because the
interrogator is distorting the meaning of the right to an attorney by falsely
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suggesting that a suspect who is assisted by an attorney will not be able to
provide exculpatory material to the authorities and “vitiat[ing] the intended
impact”154 of the second Miranda warning by intimating to the suspect that it
will be as likely that statements she makes to the police can be used in her
favor as against her.155
Between these two relatively clear examples, there are obviously a range
of cases that pose difficult problems.  Without expressly saying so, an officer
may intimate to a suspect that talking to him without an attorney will improve
her legal position.  Or he may simply redirect the conversation so that the
suspect will receive the impression that requesting an attorney will cause her
to lose some benefit she might otherwise obtain from the police or prosecutor.
In these and many other cases, the proposed test will help to focus the court’s
inquiry on the right issues but will not supply clear answers.  Ultimately, the
court will have to decide whether the officer’s interrogation tactics would
mislead the suspect (or a reasonable person in the suspect’s position) as to the
nature of the legal protection provided by any of the Miranda rights.156  In
some cases, both the government and the defendant will be able to make
reasonable arguments in support of their positions.
Consistent with Davis, moreover, a defendant will not be able to establish
a Seibert violation by merely showing that an officer responded to a suspect’s
statements or questions relating to an attorney in a way that dissuaded the
suspect from requesting one.  When dealing with a suspect who refers to an
attorney or asks a question about having one, the police have no obligation to
provide her with information that will enable her to make a wise decision with
respect to whether she should request an attorney.  If the suspect is misguided
as to how an attorney will safeguard her rights, the police have no obligation
to enlighten her.  If the suspect makes statements relating to requesting an
attorney that do not amount to an unequivocal request, the police do not have
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to respond.157  And if the suspect asks an officer to advise her as to whether
she should exercise that right, the officer may simply decline to provide such
advice.  Consistent with Davis, the Miranda warnings provide the suspect
with sufficient information for her to make that decision on her own.
If a suspect asks such a question, however, the police should not be
permitted to provide misinformation that will distort the suspect’s
understanding of the nature of the safeguard provided by the right to request
an attorney.158  Again, the focus should be on whether the officer’s answer
would be likely to distort the suspect’s understanding of any of her Miranda
rights.  If the officer tells the suspect she should not have an attorney because
it is better for her to talk to the police by herself, this should be improper
because it undermines her understanding of her right to the assistance of an
attorney.  The suspect’s right to an attorney during a custodial interrogation
stems from Miranda’s recognition that a custodial interrogation is an
adversary procedure between the police and the suspect in which the suspect
has the right to the assistance of counsel if she believes she is not capable of
dealing with the police on her own.159  Through telling the suspect that she is
better off dealing with the police on her own, the police distort the suspect’s
understanding of the Miranda warnings by leading her to believe that she is
not facing an adversary procedure in which the assistance of counsel may be
necessary.160
In addition, if the suspect is seeking information relating to the
circumstances under which the right to an attorney will be provided, the police
should be required to supply that information.  In Davis, the Court stated that
“[t]he rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must respect a suspect’s
wishes regarding his right to have an attorney present during custodial
interrogation.”161  Davis’s conclusions—that a suspect’s ambiguous reference
to an attorney is not sufficient to constitute a request for an attorney or to
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trigger an obligation that the police ask clarifying questions—apparently
stemmed from the Court’s concern that either rule would burden the police by
requiring a finding that suspects who didn’t wish to request an attorney when
they made an equivocal reference to one had invoked their right to have one.162
When the suspect asks a question relating to the circumstances under which
an attorney will be appointed, however, the question indicates that she
believes she needs factual information in order to decide whether to request
an attorney.  When the factual information requested is clear and indisputable,
the suspect should be entitled to that information because she has indicated
that she needs it in order to make an informed decision as to whether to invoke
her right.
V.  APPLYING THE TESTS
In this part, I will apply the tests developed in Part IV to ten examples
drawn from nine cases that illustrate the interrogation tactics discussed in Part
II.  In all of these examples, the courts’ opinions apparently provide full and
accurate accounts of the police interrogation tactics employed.163  I will
consider four cases in which the suspect refers to the possibility of requesting
an attorney, three in which an officer responds to a suspect’s question relating
to whether he should have an attorney, and three in which an officer responds
to a suspect’s question relating to the circumstances under which an attorney
will be provided.  In each case, I will seek to determine whether the
interrogator prevented the suspect from being “adequately and effectively”
apprised of his right to have an attorney present by either employing an
interrogation tactic that would be likely to have the effect of undermining the
suspect’s understanding of the right or failing to provide requested factual
information that would be relevant to an informed waiver of the right.
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A.  Tactics Employed When the Suspect Refers to the Possibility of
Requesting an Attorney
1.  Kaczmarek v. State164
The detectives read Kaczmarek his Miranda rights.  Kaczmarek
responded that his “attorney was coming this afternoon and [he] wondered if
[the detectives] can talk to him then.”165  The detectives responded that they
were “here now,” wanted to speak with the defendant, and would be busy in
the afternoon.166  The detectives then told Kaczmarek that if he wanted to
speak with the detectives, he could do so “now.”167  Kaczmarek then said he
would talk to the detectives; after the detectives again warned him of his
Miranda rights and received his signed waiver, they questioned him and he
gave a statement implicating himself in the crime.168
Kaczmarek is a typical example of a case in which the police take
advantage of the suspect’s misguided belief that it will be to his advantage to
tell his story to the police.  The defendant might argue that, through
emphasizing that they would not wait until the afternoon to hear his story, the
police may be tacitly suggesting to him that it would be to his advantage to tell
his story to them as soon as he can.
In this case, however, the defendant’s argument is weak.  While the
officers’ attitudes might have suggested to Kaczmarek that he would be losing
something by not taking advantage of his immediate opportunity to tell his
story to them, the officers did not explicitly or implicitly suggest to him that
talking to them could improve his legal position.  Through failing to inform
the suspect that it might be to his advantage to consult with an attorney before
deciding whether he should talk to them without one, the officers are taking
advantage of Kaczmarek’s ignorance.  Based on the Court’s analysis in
Moran, however, this does not constitute a failure to adequately apprise the
suspect of his right to an attorney.
2006] DEFLECTING A SUSPECT FROM REQUESTING AN ATTORNEY 59
169. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (D.S.D. 2003).
170. Id. at 1016.
171. Id.
2.  United States v. Eastman169
Tribal officers arrested Eastman for sexual abuse of a minor.  Later,
detectives informed him of his Miranda rights.  After Eastman read the waiver
of rights portion of the form, the following dialogue occurred:
EASTMAN: What about a public defender?
DETECTIVE NORRIS: Phillip, that’s up to you in your entirety to make that
decision.  But if you do, I’m going to send this file as is to
the U.S. Attorney’s Office without Phillip Eastman’s side
of the story.
EASTMAN: I know I didn’t rape anyone because why would I have
these [pointing to hickeys he had on his face and neck
area]?
DETECTIVE NORRIS: Phillip, if you want to tell me anything about what you did
or didn’t do or anything, I need you to sign the form if
you want to talk to myself and Larry—Detective LeBeau.
EASTMAN: Well, I know I didn’t do anything so I’ll talk to you
guys.170
Eastman then signed the waiver form and subsequently made incriminating
admissions.171
The detective told Eastman that, if he requested an attorney, his file
would go to the U.S. Attorney’s office without his story in it.  This statement
was presumably accurate.  If Eastman requested an attorney, the detective had
probably decided that he would send the file to the U.S. Attorney without
trying to question Eastman in the presence of Eastman’s attorney.
The government might argue that this case is indistinguishable from
Kaczmarek.  As in that case, the police gave the suspect no explicit or implicit
assurance that talking to the police could improve his legal position.  At most,
there is a tacit suggestion that talking to the police could help him in some
way.
In this case, however, the defense has a stronger argument than it did in
Kaczmarek.  The average person in Eastman’s position would know that the
U.S. Attorney’s office will determine what, if any, charges will be brought
against Eastman, but would not know that the inclusion of Eastman’s
statement would almost certainly have no effect on the U.S. Attorney’s
60 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:29
172. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
173. No. 03-00-00677-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7497 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001).
charging decision.  The only reason for Detective Norris to make the statement
relating to the absence of “Phillip Eastman’s side of the story” would be to
lead Eastman to believe that including his story in the file would lead the
prosecutor to treat him more favorably.  In this case, unlike Kaczmarek, there
is thus an implicit suggestion to the suspect that requesting an attorney will
impair his legal position because it will prevent him from telling his story to
the police.  Since the likely effect of the detective’s statement would be to
undermine the suspect’s understanding of the second Miranda
warning—leading him to believe that what he says to the police can be used
in his favor as well as against him172—the detective’s statement is arguably
sufficient to invalidate the suspect’s waiver of his right to an attorney.
3.  Harper v. State173
Police arrested Harper for several robberies including one in which a
person had been killed.  After he had been warned of his Miranda rights,
Harper admitted committing one robbery.  When the detectives continued the
interrogation, the following colloquy occurred:
DETECTIVE PEYTON: It’s not?  Where is it?
MR. HARPER: It’s a toy gun.  I gave it to my little brother.
DETECTIVE PEYTON: Okay.  Well, that’s nice of you.  Okay.
MR. HARPER: I don’t even want to talk unless I have me a lawyer and go
through this shit.  I don’t have to go through this shit,
right?
DETECTIVE PEYTON: Well, the first thing that’s going to happen is, you know,
you’re going to get your fingers stitched up.
MR. HARPER: No.  I don’t want them stitched up.
DETECTIVE PEYTON: Well, that’s between you and the medics, okay?  All right.
The next thing that’s going to happen is you’re going to
get woke up after while and you’re going to go before the
judge and the judge is going to see that you have warrants
out for you for a long time, a year. . . . And the judge is
going to see that you’ve been on the run for a year, and
then he’s going to see that the judge issued—another
judge issued a warrant for your arrest for aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony that could put you in the
penitentiary for the rest of your life.
What’s really—what’s really interesting is that you have
a chance to get this off your chest, and I know it’s eating
you up.  I know what happened last night is eating you up.
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MR. HARPER: I don’t know what you’re talking about.
DETECTIVE PEYTON: When things go wrong.
DETECTIVE JOHNSON: Bobby Joe, you made mention of an attorney.
MR. HARPER: Huh?
DETECTIVE JOHNSON: You made mention of an attorney.
MR. HARPER: Yeah.
DETECTIVE JOHNSON: We’ve got a good system here and I believe in it and we
told you you had the right to request an attorney before
and during any questioning.  Are you telling us you want
to terminate this interview and speak to an attorney or do
you want us to continue to discuss this matter?
MR. HARPER: Now?
DETECTIVE JOHNSON: Yes.
MR. HARPER: It’s fine.
DETECTIVE JOHNSON: What’s fine?
MR. HARPER: We can discuss this.174
Harper then confessed to another robbery and murder.175
In this case, Harper’s statement, “I don’t even want to talk unless I have
me a lawyer and go through this shit,” seems to constitute a request for an
attorney that is sufficiently unambiguous to meet the Davis test.  If it is, then
Detective Peyton’s statements to Harper that he had a “chance to get this off
[his] chest” by talking to the police would appear to constitute interrogation
in violation of Edwards because Peyton made these statements before Harper
initiated further “communications or exchanges” with the police.176
If Harper’s statement is not viewed as an unequivocal request for an
attorney, then the detectives’ subsequent interrogation tactics raise two
questions:  First, did the detectives violate Harper’s rights by failing to answer
his question, “I don’t have to go through this shit, right?”  And, second, did
their subsequent tactics—which eventually deflected him from requesting an
attorney—undermine his understanding of any of the Miranda rights?
Taken in context, Harper’s question can best be understood as asking for
clarification as to what would happen if he requested an attorney.  In effect,
he was asking the detectives whether his request for an attorney would prevent
them from questioning him without one.  An accurate answer to his question
would be:  “If you request an attorney, we will not be permitted to question
you until an attorney is present.”  Since under Davis the Miranda warnings
themselves provide suspects with sufficient information relating to their
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constitutional rights, however, the detectives had no obligation to answer his
question.
Detective Peyton’s subsequent interrogation tactics deflected Harper from
requesting an attorney by focusing his attention on the value of telling his
story to the police.  In deciding whether Detective Peyton’s interrogation
tactics were permissible, the focus should be on whether the detective
suggested to Harper that failing to tell his story to the police would result in
adverse legal consequences.  If it did, then, based on the analysis presented in
Eastman,177 the detectives’ tactics should be impermissible because their
likely effect would be to undermine the suspect’s understanding of the second
Miranda warning.
The defendant could argue that the point of Detective Peyton’s iteration
of Harper’s legal problems—the warrants against him, including “a warrant
for his arrest for [a felony] that could put [him] in the penitentiary for the rest
of [his] life”—is to suggest to Harper that he is in a “bad place” and,
therefore, it is in his best interest to cooperate with the police.  The fact that
Detective Peyton recounts these matters immediately after Harper asks about
having an attorney arguably strengthens this argument because Peyton’s
timing communicates to Harper that, in view of his serious legal problems, he
has a better alternative than requesting an attorney.  Peyton’s next sentence
communicates to him that that alternative is to tell his story to the police.
Detective Johnson’s statement that requesting an attorney will lead them to
“terminate this interview,” moreover, would emphasize to Harper that he must
choose between requesting an attorney or telling his story to the police
without one.
The government can argue, however, that, while the detectives
undoubtedly deflected Harper from requesting an attorney, they did not
accomplish this by suggesting to him that his failure to tell his story to the
police would result in adverse legal consequences.  Instead, Detective Peyton
merely explained to Harper that telling his story to the police would enable
him “to get this off [his] chest” and thereby enable him to feel better.
Although this is a close case, the government’s argument seems stronger
than the defendant’s.  There does not appear to be clear evidence that the
detectives’ interrogation tactics would be likely to lead Harper (or a
reasonable suspect in his position) to believe that telling his story to the police
without an attorney would improve his legal position.  Accordingly, their
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tactics did not undermine Harper’s understanding of any of his Miranda rights
and should not vitiate his waiver of his right to request an attorney.
4.  Commonwealth v. Redmond178
Detective Molleen arrested Redmond for murder; after Molleen read him
his Miranda rights, Redmond waived his rights and answered some questions.
About two hours into the interrogation, the following colloquy occurred:
REDMOND: These are some pretty deep charges.
DETECTIVE MOLLEEN: Listen to what I got to say.  I don’t think.  I don’t want
you to seem arrogant.  Okay.  I don’t want you to seem
arrogant.  I want you to do the best thing for yourself.
And the best thing for yourself is you need to take some of
the heat off your back.  Yeah, they are very serious
charges.  This is the only opportunity you’re ever going to
[have to] talk and give your side.  Period.  This is . . .
REDMOND: Can I speak to my lawyer?  I can’t even talk to a lawyer
before I make any kinds of comments or anything?
DETECTIVE MOLLEEN: You can do anything you like, but I’m telling, I’m telling
you like this.  You have the freedom to do anything you
want.  You have the freedom to go to sleep right now if
you want to do that.  Okay?  You have the freedom to sit
here and talk to me.  Okay?  The point is and what I’m
trying to tell you is, this is your opportunity; this is your
time.  There ain’t tomorrow, there ain’t later.  Okay?
There’s not later.  There is no later.  And I’m trying, I’m
trying to give you because you are a 24 year old man the
opportunity to help yourself out a little bit.  You got a lot
of years to live.  Okay.  You got a lot of people probably
around you who really care for you.  A lot of people over
in the area talked highly of you.  A couple of detectives
talked highly of you last night.  Okay.  And I don’t think
in my mind, and I can’t really prove that you went over
there with intentions of doing anything wrong.  But
sometimes bad things can happen.179
Redmond then made incriminating statements to Detective Molleen.180
When Redmond asked if he could speak to a lawyer, Detective Molleen
diverted him from his immediate concern by telling him he could do anything
he wanted and then mentioning possibilities that did not include talking to an
attorney.  Molleen’s primary interrogation tactic, however, was to
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communicate to Redmond that this was his one “opportunity” to tell his story
to the detective.  He added, moreover, that he was trying to give Redmond
“the opportunity to help [himself] out a little bit.”  From the context, Detective
Molleen clearly intended to communicate to Redmond that if he told his story
at this time, he might be able to improve his legal position.
In this case, the detective’s interrogation tactics would have the effect of
undermining the suspect’s understanding of the right to request an attorney.
Through his comments to Redmond, Detective Molleen indicated that the one
option that could possibly improve his legal position would be to tell his story
to Molleen at that time.  He also made it clear that requesting an attorney was
inconsistent with that option.  Molleen’s communications to Redmond would
thus have the effect of distorting the latter’s understanding of the rule that
anything he says to the police can be used against him.  Instead of realizing
that an attorney could advise him as to whether he should make statements to
the police and thereby risk incriminating himself, a reasonable suspect in
Redmond’s position would be led to believe that making statements to the
police would improve his legal position.  In view of the detective’s
interrogation tactics, the suspect was not “adequately and effectively
apprised” of his second Miranda right, and his subsequent waiver of the right
to an attorney was invalid.
B.  Responding to a Suspect’s Question Relating to Whether He Should
Have an Attorney
1.  Soffar v. Cockrell [The Defendant’s First Question]181
Officer Clawson responded to Soffar’s question concerning whether he
should have an attorney by advising him that he should request one only if he
was innocent; he told him that he should talk to the police without an attorney
“if he was involved in the crime.”182  Since Clawson could infer from Soffar’s
prior disclosures to other officers that Soffar did not deny that he had some
involvement in the crime, Clawson essentially advised Soffar to talk to the
police without an attorney.183
When an officer responds to a suspect’s question of whether he should
have an attorney in this way, the officer’s answer clearly undermines the
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suspect’s understanding of the protection afforded by the right to request an
attorney.  The officer’s answer is likely to lead the suspect to believe that,
although he has the right to request an attorney, his legal position will be
adversely affected if he requests one rather than talking to the police on his
own.  Such an answer will be likely to distort the suspect’s understanding of
the Miranda warnings by leading him to believe either that telling the police
about his involvement in the crime will be to his advantage (thus distorting the
meaning of the second Miranda warning) or that an attorney’s advice as to
whether he should talk to the police will be of no value (thus negating the
right to request an attorney).  Accordingly, Clawson’s interrogation tactics
should be held to invalidate Soffar’s waiver of his right to an attorney.184
2.  People v. Oaks185
Detective Hamilton advised Oaks of his Miranda rights and questioned
him about the death of a three-year-old child.186  After Oaks made several
incriminating admissions, Detective Hamilton told him he was under arrest,
again gave him Miranda warnings and asked him if he would be willing to
make a written statement.187  The following colloquy then occurred:
OAKS: I don’t know.  Should I see a lawyer?
HAMILTON: That’s up to you.  I’ve already read you your rights.  You’ve already
admitted it with three witnesses, okay, ’cause I told you before when
you put it in writing or admit that you’re, number one, you know if
you’re truthful we can corroborate things.  You’re only helping
yourself.  But you’re also incriminating yourself.
* * *
So whether or not you need an attorney you have to tell me, all
right?
OAKS: Uh huh.
HAMILTON: But that’s up to you.  If you want to give me a statement fine, I’ll be
happy to take it.  If you don’t then I won’t.  No problem.  I’m not
going to get pissed at you.  No big deal.  That’s something you have
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to sort out for yourself, okay?  I’m here to do my job.  And I have to
honestly tell you that I believe it’s in your best interest, okay?188
Oaks then agreed to make a written statement and briefly answered
Hamilton’s additional questions.189
Detective Hamilton’s answer to Oaks’s question as to whether he should
“see a lawyer” was only marginally different from Clawson’s answer to
Soffar.  After responding, “[t]hat’s up to you,” Hamilton made it clear that
Oaks would have to choose between invoking his right to counsel and giving
a statement to the detective.  Hamilton further explained that, if Oaks gave a
statement, he would be incriminating himself.  But he also stressed that he
would be “helping” himself; and he ended by saying, “And I have to honestly
tell you that I believe it’s in your best interest.”
The essence of Hamilton’s response was thus that, even though talking
to the police without an attorney might have some adverse legal consequences,
his overall legal position would likely be improved if he talked to the police
without an attorney.  As in the Soffar case, Hamilton’s answer would likely
undermine the suspect’s understanding of his Miranda warnings by leading
him to believe that telling his story to the police without requesting advice
from an attorney would be to his advantage.190  As a result, Oaks’s waiver of
his right to an attorney should be invalid.
3.  Clark v. Murphy191
Clark, who was suspected of harming his missing stepmother, was
arrested for stealing her car.  Detective Chambers informed Clark of his
Miranda rights and asked him if he understood them.  Later, at the police
station, Clark said he did.  In the ensuing interview, Clark attempted to
provide an explanation for why he had taken his stepmother’s car.  When
Detective Chambers responded that there were serious problems with his
story, Clark said, “I think I would like to talk to a lawyer.”192  Detective
Chambers testified that he responded as follows:
I told him if you—if he wanted a lawyer I would call him one.  I told him I expected, if
in fact he wanted a lawyer and I called him one, our dialogue would be over.  I told him
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that [his sister] was there, I wanted to talk to her.  That I was going to leave him alone
for a few minutes to make a decision, and that when I returned to him I would expect his
answer.193
Chambers then left the interview room to talk to Clark’s sister.  When the
detective returned to the interview room a half hour later, Clark spoke first.
Clark told the detective that “he did not want a lawyer, and that he wanted to
continue talking.”  After the interview continued for another twenty minutes,
Clark said to Detective Chambers, “should I be telling you or should I talk to
a lawyer?”  Chambers replied, “Are you asking for my personal opinion or my
professional opinion?”  Clark reiterated that he wanted the detective’s opinion
as to whether he should be talking to a lawyer or the detective.  After a long
silence of around two minutes, Chambers told Clark that “in his personal
opinion, should the case go to trial, a judge or a jury would be concerned with
remorse.”  Using his hands as scales to illustrate the point, the detective told
Clark that the judge or jury would weigh fear of punishment against any
remorse over what happened, and that in his [the detective’s] opinion,
“remorse should outweigh fear of punishment.”  Clark responded, “well, let’s
talk about this then.”194
A short time later, Clark confessed to murdering his stepmother.195
In Clark, Detective Chambers initially deflected the suspect from
requesting an attorney by telling him that, if he wanted a lawyer, his
“dialogue” with the detective would be over.  Since the detective did not
misrepresent the value of talking to the detective without an attorney, this
tactic did not vitiate the suspect’s Miranda waiver.
Chambers’s answer to Clark’s question is more problematic.  When Clark
asked whether he should talk to a lawyer, Chambers replied that, if the case
went to trial, the judge or jury would be primarily “concerned with remorse.”
The defense could argue that this answer was intended to communicate to
Clark that he should show his “remorse” by explaining his role in the killing
of his stepmother to the detective.  While the government might respond that
Chambers could have been talking about what would happen after the case
went to trial, this response seems weak.  Since Clark was asking whether he
should talk to the detective or talk to a lawyer at that point in time, the
detective’s answer should be understood as answering that inquiry.  Upon
hearing Chambers’s answer, a reasonable person in Clark’s position would
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think it would be in his best interest to talk to the detective without a lawyer.
From Chambers’s previous statement, moreover, Clark knew that he did not
have the option of talking to the detective with a lawyer.
If this argument is accepted, the question arises whether the detective’s
interrogation tactic undermined Clark’s understanding of the second Miranda
warning.  The government can argue that the detective’s statement did not
constitute affirmative misrepresentation because the judge or jury might
actually be concerned with early evidence of Clark’s “remorse.”  As in the
Eastman and Redmond cases, however, the defense can argue that the
detective’s interrogation tactic undermined the second Miranda warning
because, instead of being clearly informed that anything he said to the
detective could be used against him, the suspect would be led to believe that
talking to the police without an attorney would have the potential for
improving his legal position.  While this is another close case, on balance the
defendant’s argument should prevail.  Detective Chambers’s answer to Clark
vitiated Clark’s waiver of his right to an attorney because its likely effect
would be to undermine Clark’s understanding of his right not to incriminate
himself.
C.  Responding to a Suspect’s Question Concerning the Circumstances
Under Which an Attorney Will Be Provided
1.  Soffar v. Cockrell [The Defendant’s Second Question]
In answering Soffar’s second question, Officer Clawson significantly
exaggerated the time it would take for Soffar to have a court-appointed
lawyer.  Instead of assuring Soffar that he would have an attorney within 72
hours, Soffar told him it could “take . . . as long as a month.”196  Based on
what Clawson knew of Soffar, it appears that, even if Clawson had accurately
answered his question, Soffar might not have requested counsel.  Since,
according to Clawson, Soffar was only able to weigh the consequences of
events that would take place in the very near future,197 it seems quite likely
that, even if Clawson had told Soffar he could have an attorney within 24
hours, Soffar would still have elected to talk to the police.
Nevertheless, Clawson’s failure to provide Soffar with accurate
information relating to when he would receive a court-appointed attorney if
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he requested one should vitiate Soffar’s waiver of that right.  Soffar’s question
indicated that he was seeking relevant information relating to the protection
provided by the right to an attorney.  Clawson’s failure to provide that
information vitiated Soffar’s waiver because it prevented him from making an
informed decision as to whether to invoke the right.
2.  United States v. Branch198
Police arrested Branch for assaulting his girlfriend.  On the day after his
arrest, Assistant D.A. Blazer questioned Branch.  While Blazer was informing
Branch of his Miranda rights, the following colloquy occurred:
MR. BRANCH: So I can get an attorney right now?
YALE BLAZER: You have the right to speak to one before you speak to me, correct.
MR. BRANCH: Right now?  Or [do I] have to wait till he comes and then wait to
come back?
YALE BLAZER: Right now this second, you can’t have an attorney.  If you wanna
wait to speak to an attorney before speaking to me, [you’re] entitled
to that right.  But I can’t get you an attorney right now, no.  You
won’t get an attorney ’til you see the judge.  Alright?  You
understand that?  Alright.  If you can’t afford an attorney, one will
be provided for you without cost.  Do you understand that?
MR. BRANCH: Yes.
YALE BLAZER: And if you don’t have an attorney available, this question is
probably what [you’re] looking for.  If you don’t have an attorney
available, you have the right to remain silent until you have an
opportunity to consult with an attorney.  Do you understand that?
MR. BRANCH: Yes.
YALE BLAZER: Okay.  Do you understand all the rights I read to you?
MR. BRANCH: Yes.
YALE BLAZER: Now that I read you your rights are you willing to answer some
questions?
MR. BRANCH: Yes.199
In response to Blazer’s questions, Branch made incriminating admissions.200
When Branch asked Assistant D.A. Blazer whether he could have an
attorney “right now,” Blazer told him he could not and further informed
Branch that he would not see an attorney until he went before the judge, a
statement that apparently accurately described the procedure followed in that
county with respect to court-appointed attorneys.  From the context, it
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appeared that Branch was asking about the availability of a court-appointed
attorney.  Since Blazer thus provided essentially accurate information in
response to Branch’s question, Branch’s waiver of his right to an attorney
should be valid.
3.  United States v. Bezanson-Perkins201
Police arrested Bezanson-Perkins for a bank robbery.  At the police
station, the detectives informed Bezanson-Perkins of his Miranda rights,
including his right to an attorney and his right to have one appointed if he
could not afford one.  The suspect and the detectives then engaged in the
following colloquy:
BEZANSON-PERKINS: It’s not going to happen right now[?]
DETECTIVE 1: No, we don’t have [a lawyer] right now.  We don’t have one
sitting there.  If you [sic], you can refuse to answer any
questions or stop giving this statement at any time you wish,
which means that if you decide at some point you want to
stop, you stop and we won’t do it any further.
BEZANSON-PERKINS: Okay.
BEZANSON-PERKINS: So if I requested a lawyer, there would be one that would
come right now?
DETECTIVE 1: No.
DETECTIVE 2: Well what we’d do is if you didn’t want to answer a question,
you don’t answer the question.
DETECTIVE 1: Ah go ahead and explain it to him if you want, whatever um,
DETECTIVE 2: Yeah I mean, the bottom-line Josh, you already told me you
know the system.  You’ve been through the system.  You have
a right to an attorney if you want.  You’d have to hire your
own lawyer.  We’d like to ask you some questions.  And
actually we just want to get your version of what happened.
Your involvement, you, you’re telling me, you mentioned
something before Detective Gaskell got in here that you
know, you[’re] a convicted felon and you[’re] in a white car
and you’re at the wrong place at the wrong time, well that’s
what we want to talk about.  We want to get your version.  If
we have a question that you don’t want to answer, say I don’t
want to answer that.  It’s as simple as that.
BEZANSON-PERKINS: Okay.202
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The detectives then proceeded to question Bezanson-Perkins about the robbery
and Bezanson-Perkins responded with incriminating statements.203
Like the defendant in Branch, Bezanson-Perkins wanted to know if he
could have an attorney “right now.”  As far as the availability of counsel for
Bezanson-Perkins was concerned, the detectives’ answers were accurate.
They told him that if he wanted to have an attorney there immediately, he
would “have to hire [his] own lawyer.”  In response to his first question, the
first detective also told him that he could refuse to give a statement or stop
giving one at any time.  He did not say that, if the suspect requested an
attorney, this would prevent the police from interrogating the suspect until an
attorney was present.  In response to the suspect’s second question, moreover,
the detectives indicated that they were explaining Bezanson-Perkins’s options.
The second detective then stated that, if the detectives asked him a question
he didn’t want to answer, he could simply “say ‘I don’t want to answer that.’”
The detectives did not explain that if the suspect requested an attorney, the
detectives would cease asking questions until an attorney was appointed.
Under the circumstances, the detectives’ failure to supply this information
should be critical.  The detectives treated the suspect’s question relating to
when he would have an attorney as a request for information relating to his
options with respect to requesting an attorney or proceeding without one.
While the detectives had no obligation to supply this information initially,
once they chose to elaborate as to the protections provided by the suspect’s
right to request an attorney, they had an obligation to supply complete and
accurate information.204
The detectives’ response to the suspect indicated that, since the suspect
could not afford to hire his own attorney who could be there immediately, he
could listen to the detectives’ questions and make his own decision as to how
to respond to them, electing not to answer those he did not want to answer.
Since the detectives neglected to inform the suspect that he could also request
an attorney and thereby ensure that the police would ask him no questions
until an attorney was present, the suspect might easily be misled into believing
that his only option was to submit to police questioning.  The detectives’
failure to supply the suspect with vital information relating to the protection
provided by the right to request an attorney should vitiate the suspect’s waiver
of that right.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
Both intuition and empirical data suggest that the suspect’s right to
request an attorney is the most powerful safeguard provided by Miranda.
Nevertheless, the actual impact of that safeguard should not be overestimated.
Richard Leo’s observation of interrogation practices indicates that even when
the police provide relatively straightforward explanations of suspects’
Miranda rights, approximately 80% of suspects waive their rights.205  As
George Thomas has pointed out,206 the most plausible explanation for this
apparently counterintuitive result is that the typical suspect believes that the
potential short-term benefits of telling a plausible story to the police will
outweigh the potential long-term consequences of providing statements that
can be used by the police to incriminate him.  Since the typical suspect may
also believe that “turn[ing] down that free lawyer” will assist in persuading
the police of his candor,207 the great majority of these suspects are unlikely to
even ask about or refer to the possibility of requesting an attorney.  Rules
relating to interrogation tactics designed to deflect suspects from invoking
their right to an attorney are thus unlikely to have a dramatic effect on the
extent to which suspects waive their Miranda rights.  Even if stricter rules are
applied, the great majority of suspects will continue to waive their rights.
As to those suspects who do refer to the possibility of requesting an
attorney, however, the Court’s decision in Davis has had a significant impact.
Prior to Davis, most lower courts provided at least some protection for
suspects who expressed an interest in requesting an attorney.  If the suspect
made an ambiguous reference to an attorney, the majority of lower courts held
that the police were required to ascertain the suspect’s wishes by asking
clarifying questions before proceeding with the interrogation.  In conjunction
with this requirement, lower courts often closely scrutinized interrogation
tactics designed to dissuade suspects from requesting attorneys.
Davis’s holding that the police may ignore suspects’ ambiguous
references to counsel has had unanticipated consequences.  As a result of
Davis, lower courts have mostly abandoned restrictions on police interrogation
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tactics designed to deflect a suspect from requesting an attorney.  So long as
the police have informed the suspect of her right to request an attorney and
have not coerced the suspect into waiving that right, post-Davis cases have
generally held that interrogation tactics that deflect the suspect from
requesting an attorney will not invalidate the suspect’s waiver of her right to
an attorney.
In Miranda, the Court expressly prohibited police “trickery” that induced
a suspect’s waiver of her Miranda rights.  In post-Miranda cases, the Court
distinguished between “affirmative misrepresentation,” which might constitute
such trickery, and a failure to disclose information relevant to the waiver
decision, which would not.  In Missouri v. Seibert, however, the Court
indicated that the police would be barred from employing interrogation
practices that intentionally undermined the suspect’s understanding of the
Miranda rights.
During the post-Davis era, police have employed a variety of
interrogation tactics that have the effect of deflecting suspects from invoking
their right to an attorney.  In contrast to the interrogation tactic employed in
Seibert, however, it is not clear that interrogation manuals or interrogation
training208 advise the police to employ these tactics in order to undermine
suspects’ Miranda rights.  The indisputable evidence of interrogators’
intent—which was present in Seibert—is thus often lacking in these cases.
The practices which post-Davis interrogators employ to deflect suspects
from requesting counsel indicate, however, that the police are not only aware
of the looser restrictions imposed by post-Davis courts, but also that, to
paraphrase Justice Jackson, they have interpreted those restrictions “for
themselves and pushed them to the limit.”209  While the post-Miranda Court
has undoubtedly weakened Miranda’s prohibition against “trickery” designed
to induce Miranda waivers, post-Miranda cases have been adamant in
insisting that a suspect who wishes to deal with the police only with the aid
of counsel has the right to do so.210  In seeking to restrain the police from
employing improper interrogation practices, moreover, the post-Miranda
Court has opted for objective tests that focus on a police interrogation tactic’s
likely effect on a suspect rather than subjective ones that focus on the
interrogator’s state of mind at the time she employed the tactic.
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In order to safeguard a custodial suspect’s right to the assistance of an
attorney, courts need to develop rules that prevent the police from employing
at least some interrogation tactics that deflect suspects from requesting the
assistance of counsel.  In view of the post-Miranda Court’s ambivalence
towards Miranda, formulating such rules—while still adhering to the
principles articulated in post-Miranda decisions—will be difficult.  The Court
that decided Miranda would almost certainly be willing to establish a rule that
prohibited the police from discouraging a suspect from requesting an attorney
or acting in such a way that a reasonable person in the suspect’s position
would believe they were communicating that message.  This rule does have
an advantage that has frequently been recognized as important by the post-
Miranda Court.  It provides a clear guideline for the police and courts.  This
rule or a similar one could be adopted by state courts as a matter of state
constitutional law.211
Post-Miranda decisions such as Moran and Davis suggest that the
Supreme Court would not be willing to adopt such a broad prohibition.  In
Seibert, however, the Court indicated that it is at least willing to prohibit the
police from intentionally employing interrogation tactics that undermine a
custodial suspect’s understanding of the Miranda rights.  In order to make
Seibert’s prohibition meaningful, courts should prohibit the police from
employing interrogation tactics that will have the effect of undermining the
suspect’s understanding of the right to request an attorney or the rights that the
presence of an attorney during the interrogation is designed to protect.
As I explain in this article, this should mean that, in discussing the effect
of a suspect’s request for an attorney, the police should not be permitted to
distort the meaning of the Miranda warnings so that the suspect will be likely
to believe that requesting an attorney will result in adverse legal consequences
or will be likely to misunderstand the nature of the protection that requesting
an attorney will provide.  In addition, in answering suspects’ questions
relating to the right to have an attorney, officers should not be permitted to
provide inaccurate factual information relating to the circumstances under
which an attorney will be provided.  When the police engage in any of these
tactics, it should vitiate the suspect’s waiver of her right to request an
attorney.
As the cases I discuss in Part V show, it will often be difficult for courts
to determine whether an officer’s interrogation tactic had the likely effect of
undermining the suspect’s understanding of the right to request an attorney or
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one of the other Miranda rights.  In addition, it will sometimes be difficult to
determine whether officers’ answers to suspects’ questions relating to the right
to request an attorney are so inaccurate as to undermine the suspects’
understanding of any of the Miranda rights.  In many cases, both the
government and the defense will be able to present plausible arguments in
support of their positions.  While the tests I propose will not always produce
clear results, they will focus courts on the factors that should be considered
in determining whether police interrogation tactics have impermissibly
deflected a suspect from invoking her right to request an attorney as
guaranteed by Miranda and Edwards.
In Davis, the Court stated that the Miranda warnings provide the primary
protection for suspects subjected to custodial interrogation.  In order to ensure
that the warnings provide meaningful protection, however, the police should
not be allowed to employ interrogation tactics that undermine suspects’
understanding of the warnings.  Through applying the tests I have specified,
courts should be able to come closer to realizing this goal.
